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Inherent Imperialism: Understanding the legal roots of anti-
imperialist criticism of the International Criminal Court   
 
FREDERICK COWELL* 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
Since 2008 the International Criminal Court has been subject to criticism for 
being somehow imperialist and some criticism of the Court has pursued a 
distinctly anti-imperialist narrative. Whilst such criticism is often motivated by 
political considerations, this article examines whether such narrative can be to a 
certain extent due to some provisions of the Rome Statute itself, rather than the 
contingent choices made by Court organs. This involves analysing the law itself 
for traces of what this article terms ‘inherent imperialism’. This is where the text 
of an instrument implicitly envisages an unequal or hierarchical legal structure.  
If some of the Rome Statute’s features can be considered inherently imperialist, 
this could provide a partial justification for some of the political attacks on the 
Court’s choices. This article, by providing a theoretical framework, which 
interprets claims that the law is imperialist, aims to put the anti-imperialist 
attacks on the Court in perspective. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
When the International Criminal Court (ICC) was created in 1998, one of its aims was to end 
the culture of impunity that political leaders enjoyed in relation to international crimes. Some 
scholars at the time argued that the creation of a permanent judicial body would enable 
prosecutions of those with the greatest responsibility for crimes against humanity and genocide. 
Moreover, the establishment of tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, seemed to indicate a broader acceptance of international organisations and tribunals.
1
  
The preamble to the 1998 Rome Statute stated that the ICC was to “put an end to impunity” for 
the perpetrators of international crimes and that the law would “apply equally to all persons 
without any distinction based on official capacity.”2 Yet when, in 2008, the ICC first issued an 
indictment against a sitting head of state – Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir – this was the 
                                                        
* Lecturer in Law at Birkbeck School of Law, University of London. A very early draft of part of this paper was presented at 
the Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law Conference at the University of Liverpool in December 2012. I am 
grateful to Immi Tallgren for comments on the conference draft of this paper and for the hard work of Ana Leticia Magini who 
helped me with a later draft of this paper.  
1 P. Akhavan, ‘Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?’, 95 The American Journal of 
International Law (AJIL) (2001) 7 -31. R. Glossop, ‘Creating and International Criminal Court: Giant Step Forward for World 
Law 31Peace Research (1999) 1 -10. 
2  Preamble and Article 27 of the ICC Statute 1998.  
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beginning of narrative about the Court that it was an imperialist organisation. Some of this was 
motivated by concerns about the operation of the court and the politics surrounding its 
operation.
3
 On other occasions anti-imperialist criticism has been more self-interested. Abdul 
Tejan-Cole, the former Special Prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone illustrates this 
by reference to a simple example; when the former President of the Ivory Coast Laurent 
Gbagbo signed up to the Rome Statute in 2003 he broadly supported its operation. When in 
2011 he was indicted by the ICC he and his supporters criticised it as a "White man's Court" 
and complained about its "neo-colonialist" and "imperialist" prosecutions.
4
 In 2016 three states 
issued notices saying they were intending to withdraw from the ICC and other states are 
actively considering withdrawing. The Gambia used explicitly anti-colonial terms when 
announcing its withdrawal criticising the ICC for failing to tackle “heinous war crimes” from 
western states and describing it as brining “persecution and humiliation of people of colour, 
especially Africans”.5 The Kenyan parliament has previous voted on withdrawal from the ICC 
and has proposed that other states in the African Union should also leave the Court due to it 
unfairly targeting African states.
6
 
 
This article argues that, whilst many of those who label the ICC as ‘imperialist’ sometimes 
have cynical political motives, it might be possible that the ICC’s legal structure is actually 
itself imperialist.
7
 In this regard, this article uses the expression ‘imperialism’ in a non-
materialistic sense. Critiques of international law focusing on the role of economic 
accumulation or in the perpetuation of material conditions favouring the construction of an 
economic order sustaining inequalities are important, but do not assist with an analysis of the 
ICC whose principal function is to adjudicate on individual criminal responsibility.
8
 Rather, as 
the second section of this article argues, international instruments can possess structural 
features which are inherently imperialist in that they are predicated on the domination of 
weaker states and the diminution of their sovereign decision making capacities. Certain 
provisions within the Rome Statute can be read as inherently imperialist in that they envisage a 
legal relationship with states predicated on an on-going sovereign dominance of the 
organisation over the state. Inherent imperialism compliments existing theoretical explanations 
of anti-imperialist hostility to the ICC.  One of the most common readings of the ICC legal 
framework is that it is a liberal or cosmopolitan institution since the Court assists in the pursuit 
of justice and promotes universalist aims, such as ending impunity for those responsible for 
                                                        
3  For example of criticism engaging with structural inequalities and anti-imperialism - see for example T. Reinold, 
‘Constitutionalization? Whose Constitutionalization? Africa’s ambivalent engagement with the International Criminal Court’ 
10 International Journal Of Constitutional Law (I-Con) (2012) 1076-1105. Also see an explanation of anti-imperialist criticism 
of the ICC in dialogic terms D. Robinson, ‘Inescapable dyads: why the International Criminal Court cannot win’, 23 Leiden 
Journal of International Law (2015) 323-347. 
4 A. Tejan-Cole, ‘Is Africa on trial?’ BBC News 27 March 2012 available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
17513065   (accessed 11 January 2016).  
5 Reuters ‘Gambia announces withdrawal from International Criminal Court’ World News Reuters 26 October 2016 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-gambia-icc-idUSKCN12P335?il=0 (accessed 21 November 2016). 
6 Agence France-Presse ‘African Union members back Kenyan plan to leave ICC’ The Guardian 1 February 2016 
available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/01/african-union-kenyan-plan-leave-international-
criminal-court (accessed 21 November 2016). 
7 For an example of a critique see R. Cole, ‘Africa's Relationship with the International Criminal Court with the International 
Criminal Court: More Political than Legal’, 14 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2013) 670 -698.  
8M. Neocleous, ‘International law as primitive accumulation; or, the secret of systematic Colonization’, 23 European Journal 
of International Law (EJIL) (2012) 941-962.  
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serious international crimes.
9
 This provides a partial explanation as to why its operation might 
be interpreted as imperialist but in practice the court is relatively powerless and struggles to 
enforce its decisions.  Critical theorists of international law have focused on the ICC’s origins 
noting that states from the Global South were marginalised in its construction in a manner that 
is symptomatic of the marginalisation of postcolonial states more generally in international 
law.
10
 Again this offers a partial explanation of anti-imperialism; many states from the Global 
South experienced juridical inequalities but do not engage in anti-imperialist attacks on the ICC 
and actively support its operation.
11
 By focusing on what the law intends inherent imperialism 
can provide a reading of certain provisions of the Rome Statute that explains why in practice 
the law contributes to anti-imperialist attacks on the ICC.  
 
True, the ICC has been resource starved and suffered from lack of cooperation from some state 
parties. However, inherent imperialism is a means of analysing what a legal instrument 
envisions the world to be, not what the way it actually shapes the world. Those who hold that 
the anti-imperialist criticism of the ICC is largely political focus too much on the contingent 
application and operation of the law, forgetting critically interrogate the world imagined by that 
law.
12
 This article tries to assess whether certain provisions of the Rome Statute are inherently 
imperialist. It assesses in particular the doctrine of complementarity under Article 17, the role 
of the Security Council under Article 13 and the prosecutorial powers under Article 15.  This 
reading of the Rome Statute explains how juridical structures generate anti-imperialist political 
arguments. To what extent these arguments matter is, as the conclusion notes, contingent upon 
individual political perspectives. Yet, criticism of the ICC in increasingly incendiary anti-
imperialist terms is a feature of the world in which the ICC operates. This article tries to 
identify the legal causes of this criticism and concludes by sketching out how certain features 
of the Rome Statute could be designed differently to minimise inherent imperialism.  
 
2. What is inherent imperialism?  
 
To understand the anti-imperialist critique it is firstly necessary to briefly define what is meant 
by ‘imperialism’. Whilst ‘imperialism’ is often associated with colonialism, in particular 
Western European colonialism, it is important to separate the two as the practice of imperialism 
continued after decolonisation. Whilst ‘colonisation’ – Michael Doyle argues – refers to the 
practice of “settling territories”, ‘imperialism’ describes instead the process of “maintaining an 
empire.”13 Other attempts to define ‘imperialism’ have also differentiated physical empires 
from the extraterritorial control, in a material or legal sense, of weaker states in the 
international system.
14
 Most notably Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s definition of ‘Empire’ 
                                                        
9 A. Fichtelberg ‘Democratic Legitimacy and the International Criminal Court: A Liberal Defence’ 4 Journal of international 
Criminal Justice (2006) 765-785. 
10 See C. Schwöbel  ‘The Comfort of International Criminal Law’ 24 Law and Critique (2013) 169-191, at 181-82. I. Tallgren, 
‘Who are ‘We’ in International Criminal Law? On Critics and Membership’ in C. Schwöbel (ed.) Critical Approaches to 
International Criminal Law: An Introduction (London: Routledge 2013) 71-95. 
11 For a good overview see E. Keppler, ‘Managing setbacks for the International Criminal Court in Africa’, 56 Journal of 
African Law (2012) 1-14. 
12 See for example K. Ambos ‘Expanding the Focus of the ‘African Criminal Court’’ in W Schabas, Y. McDermott and N. 
Hayes The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law (Surry: Ashgate, 2013) 499-529. 
13  M. Doyle Empires (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986) 30- 37. 
14 H. Magdoff Imperialism: from the Colonial Age to the Present (New York: Monthly Press, 1978). 
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as a “decentred and deterritorializing apparatus of rule” captures how imperialism can be 
understood as a form of external dominance, but not necessarily territorial control, of a state 
that is characterised by unequal relations of power.
15
 
 
In order to understand whether or not a legal instrument is itself imperialist one should not 
assess only what that instrument does in practice, but also the sort of world that the text of that 
instrument imagines. This is the sort of exercise undertaken by Stephen Humphrey’s in the 
Theatre of the Rule of Law where he analyses the nature of the rule of law contained within the 
legal structures of the World Bank’s Good Governance programmes.16 This is different from 
assessing the fact of economic or territorial dominance, as some international relations scholars 
have done when examining trade barriers and humanitarian intervention as forms of 
imperialism.
17
  What they are analysing here is neo-imperialism, which is a state practice and 
not necessarily contingent upon the particular form of a legal instrument. For example, the 
doctrine of self-defence as set out in Article 51 of the UN Charter does not necessarily connote 
a relationship of dominance of weaker states by stronger states and the ICJ have been critical of 
attempts to use it for these purposes.
18
 However, Article 51 has also been used as the 
justification for practices such as drone strikes, which are often criticised as being a neo-
imperialist practice.
19
 Crucially, Article 51 does not envisage a hierarchical form of dominance 
of one party by another. 
 
International relations scholars examining hierarchy and the role it plays in generating 
authority have focused both on the role of formal-legal relationships and on the role that 
informal networks of power and control have over states.
20
 David Lake defines hierarchy as a 
collective of individuals “possessing authority” over another collective in a manner that 
legitimately controls their actions and notes that there is a relationship between this and 
patterns of informal imperialism.
21
 The important question to ask therefore is whether a legal 
instrument envisages this form of dominance over a state and the constriction of their sovereign 
decision-making capacities. There is an important point to be made about the indeterminacy of 
legal instruments, which critical legal scholars have often sought to highlight in order to 
challenge the underlying political assumptions behind the law and the way that they underpin 
                                                        
15 M. Hardt and A. Negri Empire (Boston: Harvard University Press 2000) xii-xiii. 
16 S. Humphreys Theatre of the Rule of Law: Transnational Legal Intervention In Theory And Practice (Cambridge: CUP 
2012) 
17 See respectively W. Bello ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Evolution of a Dangerous Doctrine’ Focus on the Global South, 19 
January 2006 available online at http://www.tni.org/archives/archives_bello_humanitarian accessed 10 January 2016. M.W. 
Janis ‘Towards a New International Order by M. Bedjaoui’, 6 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 
(1983) 355 -360. 
18 See Judgment, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) I.C.J. Reports 
2005, p.168.  
19 See W. Banks ‘Regulating Drones: Are Targeted Killings by Drones Outside Traditional Battlefields Legal’ in P. Bergen and 
D. Rothenberg Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law and Policy (Cambridge, CUP 2015) 129-159.  On the association 
with imperialism see Larry Everest ‘The Illegality, Illegitimacy and Immorality of U.S. Drone Strikes’ Global Research, 
November 05, 2013 available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-illegality-illegitimacy-and-immorality-of-u-s-drone-
strikes/5356886 (visited 11 January 2016). 
20 See J. Hobson ‘The Twin Self-Delusions of IR: Why ‘Hierarchy’ and Not ‘Anarchy’ is the core concept of IR’ 42 
Millennium Journal of International Studies (2014) 557-575. D. Lake Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press 2009). 
21 Ibid Lake, at 51-52. 
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existing forms of structural injustice.
22
 Martti Koskenniemi frames indeterminacy as an 
analytic tool for identifying “political preference” within the structure of the law but argues 
that the more relevant debate is how international institutions shape particular vocabularies and 
sub-disciplines of international law.
23
 Inherent imperialism, as an analytic tool, utilises the 
framework of indeterminacy in its consideration of the underlying assumptions of the 
international law. However, the question of what an instrument envisages involves looking at 
the implicit assumptions it makes about the world as well as the origins of an instrument and its 
framing. There are three specific elements which make an instrument inherently imperialist, 
which are set out in the remainder of this section. Not all of these elements have to be present 
in an instrument for it to be considered inherently imperialist and they describe what the text of 
instrument envisages; they do not necessarily mean that the instrument itself is used for actual 
imperial dominance. 
A. Consequential sovereign inequality  
One ought to remember that the nature of sovereignty as a legal concept is unequal. Legal 
regimes that presuppose the diminution of sovereign powers will invariably operate within the 
context of unequal sovereignty.  Historically international law was responsible for the 
development of imperialism and the modern concept of sovereignty is in many ways built upon 
doctrines that emerged during the colonial-imperial era in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.
24
 The legal sovereignty of postcolonial states was shaped by former colonial powers 
which, as Anthony Anghie argues, generated a distinction between the states that created 
international law and the states that had been created by international law.
25
  As Krisch notes 
“sovereignty was accorded only to those [within] the family of nations …international law was 
European law” which meant that those whom the law did not apply to were “uncivilized … and 
not members of the [European] family.”26   In Portugal v India the ICJ acknowledged the 
existence of different forms of sovereignty in relation to the capacity to form treaties in the 
colonial era.
27
 Unequal sovereignty had a distinct effect on both the substance and form of 
international law, as Pahuja notes in her study on the right to natural resources, the structures of 
power in international law helped preserve colonial era patterns of ownership.
28
 This led to 
state’s that had been under colonial rule lacking effective control over international institutions, 
in particular the UN and UN institutions, which not only entrenched existing hierarchies (see 
the discussion below) but also gave a tangible dimension to the juridical inequalities between 
states. Sovereign inequality is an important because it directly affects the assumptions 
underpinning legal regimes. For example, the reasoning behind scholarship that argues that 
reduction in sovereign autonomy by an international regime, such as the WTO, can be 
                                                        
22 Seen N. Purvis ‘Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law’ 32 Harvard International Law Journal (1991) 81-
127 at  89-90. 
23 M. Koskenniemi ‘The politics of international law–20 years later’ 20 European Journal of International Law (2009) 7-
19, 13. 
24 A. Anghie Imperialism Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2004) 
25 A. Anghie 'The Evolution of International law: Colonial and Post-colonial realities' in R. Falk et. al (eds.) International Law 
and the Third World: Reshaping Justice (London, Routledge, 2008) 35 – 50, at 37.  
26 N. Krisch ‘More equal than the rest? Hierarchy, equality and US predominance in international law’ from M Byers and G 
Nolte (eds) United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2008) 135-175. 
27 Judgement, Portugal v India I.C.J Reports 1960 p.6 
28 S. Pahuja Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2011) 26. 
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instrumentally justified, due to concomitant gains to that state, often neglects to explore the fact 
that sovereignty in both its juridical and material forms is not enjoyed equally by all states.
29
 
Therefore a legal regime which envisages reducing the legal autonomy of a state, needs to 
acknowledge that not all states enjoy equal levels of sovereignty, in order to avoid perpetuating 
existing juridical inequalities.  
 
B. Implicitly envisaged hierarchies  
In the late nineteenth century international law was seen as a virtue of European civilization, 
which presupposed Western Europe at the centre of a civilizing world order.
30
 James Tully’s 
examination of imperialism notes that the informal mechanisms of imperialism that 
characterised colonial-imperialism in the nineteenth century, now characterise the neo-
imperialism of western powers that use international law to construct a network of power.
31
 
Tully’s analysis points towards there being a need for a sovereign-imperial formation at the 
heart of international law something which Hardt and Negri also identify.
32
 This is in part 
because the nature of law itself, Peter Fitzpatrick argues, points towards some form of unifying 
power behind it, which makes imperialism within international law’s operation inevitable.33  
This is not to suggest that there is a definitive imperial formation in operation in the world 
today however, the centralisation of international legal apparatus and the creation of regimes 
involving international tribunal’s compulsory jurisdiction can make international law assume a 
hierarchical structure.
34
 The generation of hierarchy will invariably mean privileging existing 
systems of power and the construction of what Hobson describes as an “inegalitarian 
hierarchical discourse” which can then constrict the autonomy of states.35 Therefore any 
international legal regime creating a hierarchical framework can be considered inherently 
imperialist, as it envisages the perpetuation of dominance by existing powerful actors under the 
guise of international law.  
 
C. Unaccountable sovereign constraint  
Stephen Krasner notes that the concept of sovereignty has multiple components a state’s 
domestic legal sovereignty – the power to make and unmake their own laws –and international 
legal sovereignty – their recognition by other states – are two different concepts but both have 
value to a state.
36
  Where an organisation lacks material or physical coercive powers over a 
state but is tasked with enforcing international law within states, it can use powers of indirect 
coercion or exhortatory power to pressure a state into compliance - in international human 
rights law this is discussed in the context of ‘state shaming’ or collateral consequences on a 
                                                        
29 See for example K. Raustiala ‘Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law’ 6 Journal of 
International Economic Law (2003) 841-878. 
30 M. Koskenniemi ‘ Nationalism, Universalism, Empire: International Law in 1871 and 1919’ Whose International 
Community? Universalism and the Legacies of Empire; Columbia Department of History, April 2005.  
31  J. Tully Public Philosophy in a New Key Vol.2 ( Cambridge: CUP, 2008) 134-43. 
32 Hardt and Negri Multitude (London: Penguin, 2005) 205-207. 
33 P. Fitzpatrick Gods would be needed: American empire and the rule of (international) law 16 Leiden Journal of International 
Law (2003) 429-466. 
34 J. von Bernstorff ,‘Hans Kelsen on judicial law-making by international courts and tribunals: A theory of global judicial 
imperialism’, 5 ESIL Conference Paper Series (2015) 2-10.   
35 Hobson supra note 20, at 562. 
36 S. Krasner Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1999) 11-15.  
7 | P a g e  
 
state.
37
 These actions are designed to have direct practical consequences on states – for 
example if the ICC issues an arrest warrant for a member of the government of a state, then 
other states who are party to the ICC are under an obligation to arrest them.
38
 This means a 
government containing individuals who have arrest warrants issued for them are now unable to 
engage in normal diplomatic relations with the 120 other states that are party to the ICC, 
weakening their international legal sovereignty. Although this doesn’t always work in practice 
– Bashir has notably escaped arrest since an arrest warrant was issued in 2009 – this what 
Articles 86 and 92 of the Rome Statute envisage happening.  
 
This is a form of leverage to make a state change its internal laws or policies, or act in a 
particular way. Indirectly this involves weakening what Gerry Simpson describes as a state’s 
existential sovereignty which is “recognition by the international community” that an entity is 
entitled to sovereignty in “a form of the state’s own choosing”.39  In Nicaragua v US, for 
example, the ICJ condemned violations “of the freedom of choice of the political, economic, 
social and cultural system of states” by coercive measures such as armed intervention or 
economic coercion.
40
  It is possible to construct a justification of this power, with an appeal to 
cosmopolitan or teleological reasoning; such as the organisation is acting in the interests of 
values or in the long-term welfare of the citizens of that state.
41
 Yet this power is 
institutionalised in an international legal framework over which states have relatively little 
power, situating the organisation in a dominant position over the state. International legal 
doctrines such as state consent which justify this form of control from a positivist perspective, 
not only fail to take account of the on-going and evolving nature of organisational power which 
can evolve beyond the original act of consent, but also treats sovereignty as a fixed an uniform 
concept.
42
 Again this relates to specific features of the law and its design, rather than its 
application.   
 
These three elements are markers of why an international instrument can be considered 
inherently imperialist. The next section of this article will examine three provisions of the 
Rome Statute and consider why they could be considered inherently imperialist, identifying 
where appropriate one or more of the elements described in this section and what way (if any) 
the inherent imperialism of these provisions affects anti-imperialist criticism of the ICC. 
 
 
                                                        
37 J. Lebovic and E. Voeten ‘The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR’  
50 International Studies Quarterly (2006) 861-888. Douglass Cassel "Does international human rights law make a 
difference’ 2 Chicago Journal of International Law (2001) 121 
38 S. Roper and L. Barria. ‘State co-operation and International Criminal Court bargaining influence in the arrest and the 
surrender of suspects’ 21 Leiden Journal of International Law (2008) 457-476. M. Berlin, ‘Why (not) arrest? Third-party 
state compliance and noncompliance with international criminal tribunals.’  Journal of Human Rights (2016) 1-24. 
39 G. Simpson Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order ( 2nd ed. Cambridge:  
CUP, 2006) 53-54. 
40 Judgement on the Merits, Nicaragua v. United States of America I.C.J. Reports 1986, p.14 § 263. 
41 Fichtelberg Supra note 9.  
42 This problem is sketched out by O. Hathaway ‘International Delegation and State Sovereignty’ 71 Law and 
Contemporary Problems (2008) 115-149. 
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3. The inherent imperialism of Article 17: complementarity as a form of 
institutionalised sovereign inequality  
 
The principle of complementarity requires that where possible states should ensure that 
international law is enforced within their jurisdiction. Kamari Maxine-Clarke describes 
complementarity as representing “a nod to the primacy of the nation state” whilst ensuring 
“standards of international adjudication are used as the ultimate measure of justice.”43  Under 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute where states are “unwilling or unable genuinely” to carry out an 
investigation or prosecution the ICC may assert its jurisdiction.
44
 The Prosecutor’s job under 
Article 17, Rahmet Mohamed argues, is not to “compete” with states over who has jurisdiction 
but to ensure that crimes “do not go unpunished and thereby put an end to impunity.”45 The 
general sentiment at the drafting conference of the Rome Statute was that the ICC’s  
jurisdiction needed to be of an exemplary nature as otherwise it would be unable to prosecute 
the crimes that it was created to deal with.
46
  
 
A. Article 17’s Inherent Imperialism: Complementarity as Colonial Victimhood  
There are two ways of reading Article 17 as inherently imperialist. Firstly complementarity is 
premised on the existence and perpetuation of state failure and weakness. As Louise Arbour 
noted at the time of the Rome Statute’s drafting, Article 17 effectively required the Prosecutor 
to put a state on trial for its perceived failure to prosecute an international crime.
47
 Kevin Jon 
Heller disputes this interpretation, noting that in the Travaux Préparatoires of the Rome Statute 
there was no express wish from state parties to carry out the function of national courts.
48
 The 
process of complementarity however requires a state to acknowledge its own weakness in a 
specific case and its dependency on international organisations. This is reflected in the 
structure of Article 17 which, as well as dealing with cases where the state was genuinely 
unwilling, also covers cases where the state lacks “impartiality”, where there are “unjustified” 
delays or where there has been a “total or substantial collapse or unavailability” of the national 
judicial system.
49
 The former Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo remarked in 2003 that a 
sign of success would be if his office handled relatively few cases and there was an increase in 
prosecutions by state parties.
50
 The implication of that statement was that complementarity 
would only apply to truly exceptional states, incapable of mounting prosecutions. 
                                                        
43 K. Maxine-Clark “Global Justice, Local Controversies: The ICC and the Sovereignty of Victims” from M.B. Dembour and T 
Kelly Paths to International Justice: Social and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge: CUP, 2007) 134-160, at 134. 
44 For a history of this see M El Zeidy The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law; Origin, Development 
and Practice (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) chp. II.  
45 R. Mohamed ‘The role of the International Criminal Court and the Rome Statute in international criminal justice standard 
setting: some reflections’ from Rowena Maguire, Bridget Lewis, Charles Sampford (eds) Shifting Global Powers and 
International Law: Challenges and Opportunities (London: Routledge 2013) 100, at 104 
46 M. Politi ‘Reflections on Complementarity at the Rome Conference’ from Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds) 
The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice Vol.1 (CUP 2011) 144. 
47L Arbour ‘The Challenges of Litigation in the 21st Century: From the ad hoc Tribunals to the International Criminal Court’ 
(1998) ICTY Year Book 445. 
48  K. Heller ‘The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute on National Due Process’ 
17 Criminal Law Forum (2006) 255-280. 
49 Article 17 ICC Statute.  
50 Statement made by the L Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, Ceremony for the  solemn undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court, The Hague 16  June 2003. 
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Complementarity is in effect saying, as Menno Kamminga argues, that states are too weak to 
actively assert jurisdiction.
51
 
 
The language of state failure in Article 17 feeds into what Charles Call terms, ‘the Failed State 
fallacy’ which weakens the historic culpability of western powers for the role of state failure, 
as European and North American states “created the system of nation-states…propping up 
post-colonial leaders, providing them with arms …and [maintaining] weak institutions.”52  The 
language of state failure can be seen in an official report from the Office of the Prosecutor in 
late 2003, which argued that states may well be unable to carry out investigations and 
prosecutions because they were “conflict torn.”53 At the 2010 Review Conference on the Rome 
Statute a stocktaking exercise on the operation of the principle of complementarily fell into the 
trap of endorsing the failed state fallacy. It noted that states that were unable to carry out 
successful prosecutions at a national level had “domestic institutions operating in the context of 
a weak economy” and were often affected by the “lack of infrastructure” which caused a “lack 
of confidence in the judicial structure.”54 Whilst this can be read as a move to reduce of 
sovereign inequality, the reality is that moving the prosecution of an individual to a 
supranational court diminishes the domestic legal sovereignty of a host state. A mechanism that 
was genuinely designed to reduce sovereign inequality would push resources downwards to the 
state itself allowing it to rebuild its justice system. As Article 17 does not do this and instead 
provides a mechanism for enhancing the relative power of the Court it arguably fulfils the first 
element of inherent imperialism as it ignores, and arguably reinforces, existing sovereign 
inequalities.    
 
Secondly, Article 17, by underscoring the weakness of states implicitly situates them as 
victims.  Muaka Mutua noted in a critique of international human rights law, that its “grand 
narrative” specifically envisaged the notion of “savages” over whom the law needs to be 
applied.
55
 This is a distinctly colonial-imperialist configuration of universal justice based on the 
identification of an “other” or “alterity” over whom the law is supposed to save or civilise.56  
As Maxine-Clarke argues, the doctrine of complementarity does something similar by 
describing states as lacking control and power and then creates a legal regime vesting power, 
and by implication sovereignty, within the ICC. This, Maxine-Clarke argues, refuses to treat 
Africans as “political agents” seeing them “in need of salvation by a benevolent “West””.57  
This is part of a broader problem, described by Frédéric Mégret, that international criminal law 
attempts to “imagine an ideal number of recipients”.58  This fulfils the third element of inherent 
                                                        
51 M. Kamminga ‘Lessons Learned from the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offenses’ 
23 Human Rights Quarterly (HRQ), (2001) 940-974, at 950. 
52 C. Call The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State’  29 Third World Quarterly (2008) 1491- 1507, at 1499-1500. 
53 Informal Expert Paper the Principle of Complementarity in Practice, ICC-01/04-01/07-1008-AnaA 30 March 2003 § 4.  
54 M Bergsmo, O Bekou and A Jones, “Complementarity After Kampala: Capacity Building and the ICC’s Legal Tools’ , 2 
Goettingen Journal of International Law  (2010) 791-811, at 801.  
55 M. Mutua ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviours: The Metaphor of Human Rights’, 42 Harvard International Law Journal, (2001) 
201-245, at 204.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Maxine-Clarke Fictions of Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: The ICC and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa (New York: CUP, 2009)120.  
58 F. Mégret ‘In whose name? The ICC and the search for constituency’ from C. De Vos, S. Kendall, C. Stahn Contested 
Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (Cambridge: CUP 2015) 23-45, at 26. 
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imperialism as complementarity effectively institutionalises the capacity of the ICC to put a 
state’s legal system on trial. The capacity for self-referrals under Article 14 of the Rome 
Statute notionally mitigates this by allowing states to self-refer situations to the ICC.  Again 
however, it is worth reading this power in the context of sovereign inequality; states making 
such referrals may well be making a constrained choice because their domestic legal system 
and their state administration more broadly makes this the only realistic option available to 
them. Globalisation theorists have argued that a notionally voluntary action by a state in 
relation to aspects of international economic law does not necessarily mean that a state’s 
choices are really free choices.
59
 In an early piece of commentary on Article 14 Clauss Kress 
noted that although Article 14 treated the role of the Prosecutor as passive, in practice they had 
been actively managing referrals and there was a clear obligation within Article 14 that were a 
state to be unable to carry out an investigation they were “to surrender to an international 
criminal jurisdiction.”60 This indicates that the choice under Article 14 is at best constrained 
and the freedom of that choice varies according to the relative level of sovereign inequality 
experienced by a state.  
 
B. The Practical Effects of Article 17’s Inherent Imperialism 
The way that Article 17 has been interpreted and applied has often highlighted its structural 
assumptions about the weakness and underdevelopment of states. For example it is unclear that 
complementarity has had much of an impact in encouraging domestic prosecutions. As William 
Schabas notes in relation to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) cases there has been 
hardly “any beneficial effects” in terms of encouraging states to take “responsibility[y] for 
criminal justice.”61 The Trial Chamber in Katanga held that a state’s “unwilling[ness]” to bring 
a prosecution under Article 17 may include situations where a state “chooses not to investigate 
or prosecute a person before its own courts, but had nevertheless  every intention of seeing that 
justice done.”62 In 2011 the Office of Public Counsel for Victims argued in Katanga that “the 
Court’s approach to the principle of complementarity should be practical and not overly 
exacting” which as they acknowledged involved equating the inability and unwillingness of 
states to undertake prosecutions.
63
 This is a practical manifestation of the inherently imperialist 
nature of Article 17 described above and this interpretation appears to endorse the notion that 
complementarity is meant to apply to states that can be categorised as failed or failing, which 
for historical reasons is a label often associated with postcolonial states.  
The connotations of weakness and underdevelopment also help explain the relatively hostile 
institutional reaction from the AU. Institutionally the AU, and in particular its predecessor the 
                                                        
59 For examples see Hardt and Negri Supra note 15; P. Trimble  ‘Globalization, International Institutions and the Erosion 
of National Sovereignty and Democracy’ 95 Michigan Law Review (1997). See also in terms of convergence limiting the 
scope of choices D. Drezner ‘Globalization and policy convergence.’ 3 International studies review (2001) 53-78. 
60 C. Kress,  ‘Self-Referrals and Waivers of Complementarity-Some Considerations in Law and Policy’ 2 Journal of 
International Criminal  Justice (2004) 944-948 at 946. 
61 W. Schabas ‘The rise and fall of complementarity’ in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M El Zeidy (eds) at 158.  
62 Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case by the Defence of Germain Katanga Persuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the 
Statute, Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui ICC-01/04-01/07-949, Trial Chamber II March 2009, 
Paras 4-6, 9, and 14.  
63 Observations by the OPCV on the Document in Support of Appeal of the Defence for Germain Katanga against the Decision 
of the Trial Chamber on the Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case, Prosecutor v Katanga ICC-01/04-01/07  13 
August 2009. 
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OAU, had a long history of interstate solidarity which was often used to counter historic and 
contemporary practices of imperialism.
64
 A legal structure such as complementarity was likely 
to be seen through the prism of imperialism because of the connotations of weakness and 
sovereign inequality associated with its operation.  This was the view articulated by the 
Rwandan President Paul Kagame, who in a 2008 radio interview drew an explicit link with 
imperialism stating that the ICC was seeking to “undermine people from poor and African 
countries, and other powerless countries.”65 AU resolutions criticising the ICC have 
emphasised the near existential nature of the threat that they perceive the ICC poses. At the 
July 2010 AU summit in Kampala Uganda a resolution was adopted calling for member states 
to refuse cooperation with the ICC in the matter of Darfur singling out the Prosecutor for 
“making ... condescending statement[s]”.  Malawian President Bingu wa Mutharika, the then 
President of the AU condemned the ICC for issuing indictments which were "undermining ... 
African peace and security" and went on to condemn the ICC's interference with “African 
solidarity and African peace and security that we fought for so many years.”66 The broader 
problem with Article 17 is that it is one of what Carsten Stahn terms the “paternalising and 
disempowering features” of the Rome Statute which allow the Court to act in ways that appear 
to marginalise local concerns.
67
  
4. Article 13 and the power of the UN Security Council  
 
Under Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute the UN Security Council retains the power to refer 
cases to the Prosecutor. During the Rome Statute’s drafting there was a disagreement about the 
role of the Security Council, with states who were permanent members arguing for it to have an 
expanded role, especially in terms of determining the subject of investigations and 
prosecutions.
68
 The relationship between the Security Council and the Prosecutor’s office was 
clarified in the 2004 ‘Relationship Agreement’ which stated that the ICC retained the status of 
a permanent judicial institution with legal personality.
69
 The separation between the two bodies 
allowed the ICC to preserve its judicial independence. As Amal Alamuddin summarises it the 
legal position under the Rome Statute is that the Security Council “can expand the Court’s 
jurisdiction but not dictate what it does with it.”70 
 
A. The Inherent imperialism of Article 13  
                                                        
64 For an overview see I. Shivji, ‘Pan-Africanism or Imperialism? Unity and Struggle towards a New Democratic Africa’, 1 
Law, Social Justice & Global Development (2008)  3-11 available online at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2008_2/shivji/shivji.pdf (last viewed 3 February 2016).  
65 International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues' Congressional research Service 7-5700 22 July 2011  
66Aljazeera ‘ AU chief slams ICC Bashir warrants’ Aljazeera Africa 25 July 201 available online at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/07/201072571956380906.html (last viewed 3 Feb 2016). 
67 Stahn ‘Justice civilisatrice? The ICC,post-colonial theory and faces of ‘the local’ in De Vos et al. (eds.) Supra note 58  at  
83.  
68 W. Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities: Justice, Politics, and Rights at the War Crimes Tribunals (OUP 2012)  202. 
69 ICC ‘Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations’ ICC-ASP-3- res 
1 available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/916FC6A2-7846-4177-A5EA-
5AA9B6D1E96C/0/ICCASP3Res1_English.pdf (last viewed 5 February 2016).   
70 A. Alamuddin ‘The Role of the Security Council in Starting and Stopping cases at the International Criminal Court: 
problems of Principle and Practice’ from Andraž Zidar and Olympia Bekou (eds) Contemporary Challenges for the 
International Criminal Court (BIICL 2014) 128.  
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There are two ways of reading Article 13 as inherently imperialist. Firstly by institutionalising 
the power of the Security Council, the Rome Statute perpetuates what Simpson termed its 
“legalised hegemony”.71  The core theories interpreting the relationship between the Court and 
the Council point to this entrenchment of privilege as Deborah Ruiz Verduzco notes, the 
dominant view favoured by members of the Security Council is that the ICC is an instrument 
for the preservation of international peace and security with Security Council acting almost as 
an international executive.
72
 In Hardt and Negri’s view this has made the ICC a mechanism for 
reproducing and reinterpreting “the political hierarchy of Empire” as it operates in service of 
the management of wars for imperial powers rather than holding them to account.
73
 Even if one 
is prepared to acknowledge that Article 13 attempts to balance competencies within the 
international legal system the problem Richard Dicker argues, is that by virtue of “their genesis 
in a political body” the “investigations and prosecutions” resulting from Article 13 referrals are 
viewed as “tainted.”74  Schabas’ follows a related line of argument, noting that the “deference” 
of the Court towards the Security Council is at the root of the criticism that the ICC is 
politicised.
75
 The mere fact that the Rome Statute contains a clause empowering the Security 
Council is in itself inherently imperialist as the Security Council grants direct juridical 
privileges to a narrow group of states – the permanent members who hold the power of veto – 
underscoring the inequality between states in line with the first element of inherent 
imperialism. 
 
Secondly Article 13 gives the Security Council the power to effectively universalise the ICC’s 
jurisdiction by enabling the Prosecutor initiate investigations in states that are not party to the 
ICC. In this respect Article 13 represents a broader tension within the ICC as to whether it is an 
organisation governed by state consent or is a supranational organisation.
76
 On one side of the 
argument M Cherif Bassiouni argued that the “ICC was never intended to be a supra-national 
legal institution” and was intended as an institution of “last resort”.77 This interpretation sits 
somewhat uneasily with the Security Council’s power of referrals which Bassiouni describes as 
a “jurisdictional resort of convenience” seemingly implying a relationship where the Security 
Council was much more powerful than the ICC.
78
 David Chandler puts the other side of the 
case, arguing that the ICC was part of a broader liberal trend in the 1990s which saw an 
“extension of the state form to the international level and with this the constitution of a global 
community bound by shared norms and laws”.79 This cosmopolitan vision is seemingly closer 
to the power outlined in Article 13 and is representative of what Mireille Delmas-Marty terms 
the contradiction in the statute, that the ICC appears to evoke a universalism whilst containing 
                                                        
71 Simpson supra note 39, at 7. 
72 D. Verduzco ‘The relationship between the ICC and the United Nations Security Council’ from Carsten Stahn (eds) The Law 
and Practice of the International Criminal Court (Oxford: OUP 2015) 31-35. 
73  Hart and Negri supra note 32, at 29. 
74 R. Dicker ‘The International Criminal Court (ICC) and Double Standards of International Justice’ from Stahn (eds) supra 
note 72, at 3. 
75 Schabas ‘The Banality of International Justice’, 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICJ) 545-551, at 550.  
76 B. Schiff ‘Universality meets Sovereignty at the International Criminal Court’ from M. Cox and N. Shawki Negotiating 
Sovereignty and Human Rights: Actors and Issues in Contemporary Human Rights Politics (Ashgate 2009) 59-80. 
77 M Cherif Bassiouni ‘The ICC — Quo Vadis?’ 4 JICJ (2006) 421-427, at 422. 
78 Ibid.  
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provisions that politically constrain its operation.
80
 The distinct problem with the cosmopolitan 
vision of the ICC is that there remain deep asymmetries of power between states which means 
that any utopian project to dilute sovereignty is invariably going to affect some states more 
than others.  As Jonathan Graubart and Latha Varadarajan argue, in a critique of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia’s prosecution of Slobodan Milosevic, the 
utopian project of universal justice cannot dilute the relatively unequal international order in 
which it operates.
81
  This line of argument is similar to the one advanced in relation to Article 
17 and the inherent imperialism of Article 13 in this respect is due to universalism being 
unequal and creating a hierarchy within international law, fulfilling all three elements of 
inherent imperialism. 
 
B. The Practical Effects of Article 13’s Inherent Imperialism 
The definitive practical effect of Article 13’s inherent imperialism is that it contributes to the 
‘double standards’ attack – the argument that the Court applies one standard to powerful 
nations and another to less powerful nations. The absence of three of the five veto holding 
powers on the Security Council from the ICC in essence means that the Security Council 
retains a significant supervisory control of its prosecutions without ceding any responsibility to 
Court for their own actions. In 2005 just as the US Congress was putting pressure on countries 
to guarantee immunity for US citizens that might be charged by the ICC for their actions 
overseas, the US state department was working with the prosecutor to ensure indictments in 
Sudan.
82
 In their analysis of the referral of the Darfur situation to the ICC Luigi Condorelli and 
Annalisa Ciampi noted that the resolution contained numerous inconsistencies designed to 
retrench the existing position of the US with regard to immunities from prosecution and 
financial support of the Court, but still allow it to support ICC involvement in this case.
83
  This 
was echoed in arguments over the Al-Bashir indictment in the AU. Whilst some states such as 
Ghana and Tanzania defended the ICC, other states were much more forthright in their attacks 
on the Court’s perceived double standards. Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn 
criticised “the double standard that both the United Nations Security Council and the ICC have 
displayed”.84 AU Commissioner Jean Ping commenting on the Gaddafi indictment said the 
court was “discriminatory” because it was yet another example of the ICC only going after 
crimes committed in Africa while ignoring crimes by Western powers in Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.
85
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Some of these arguments were often advanced in a highly cynical manner and as Udombana 
noted the AU’s defence of sovereignty in the Darfur case was often highly contradictory.86 
Nevertheless, these arguments can gain a veneer of plausibility as one of the causes of double 
standards is that Article 13 seemingly enhances existing hierarchies in international law. This is 
particular apparent when members of the Security Council use their votes on Article 13 
references to protect political allies. In 2014 Russia and China vetoed an Article 13 referral in 
the case of Syria, as its government was a mutual ally of both states.
87
 In 2005 a diplomatic 
row broke out when the Chinese declined to veto the resolution on referring the case in Sudan 
to the ICC after China had indicated it would protect Sudan.
88
 This essentially was the 
dispensing of juridical privilege by veto holding states to client states under their protection 
and the process of managing client states was identified by David Harvey as a core facet of the 
development of classical imperialism and neo-imperialism.
89
 
 
5. Article 15 and the Power of Prosecutor 
The office of the Prosecutor under Article 15 has a proprio motu (i.e. of its own initiative) 
power to initiate investigations independently, without referral from a state party or from the 
Security Council. This power was initially opposed by the ILC who in 1994 commented that 
proprio motu powers were not advisable “at the present stage of development of the 
international legal system.”90 As Fabricio Guariglia observed, the “imaginary character of the 
frivolous prosecutor” was a common feature of debates about the Prosecutor’s powers, both at 
the time of the Rome Statute’s drafting and later during the debate on the Crime of 
Aggression.
91
 Article 15 requires the prosecutor to analyse the seriousness of the information 
received and then ask the Pre-Trial Chamber authorization to open an investigation. The latter 
then decides whether there is a reasonable basis for initiating an investigation. In the Situation 
in the Cote’ d’Ivoire the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed the “continuing crimes" doctrine which 
allowed the Prosecutor to bring charges in relation to situations that went beyond the facts 
contained in the original referral.
92
 This gives the Prosecutor considerable power to define the 
nature of the criminal offences brought before the court and the scope of this power raises the 
potential for Article 15 to be considered inherently imperialist.  
A.  The purported inherent imperialism of Article 15  
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The inherent imperialism of Article 15 is not as clear as the arguments relating to Articles 13 
and 17. It is important to acknowledge, as Tor Krever notes, that at an international level 
“politics lies in the motivation behind a particular prosecution” as the choice of whom to 
prosecute and what to prosecute them for are choices guided by political considerations.
93
 
When the Prosecutor exercises their power under Article 15 about which situations to bring 
before the Pre-Trial Chamber and how to frame the offences against individuals, they are 
engaging in a form of political decision-making. This decision making however takes place 
within a legal structure which is hierarchical, in along the lines described in the third element 
of inherent imperialism. Margaret deGuzman seeking to contextualise the numerous criticisms 
that have been levelled at the Prosecutor, noted that whilst the Court had been created 
“adjudicate "the most serious crimes” it had “a budget that enables only a handful of 
prosecutions per year”.94 Whilst the thrust of deGuzman’s argument is that decisions of the 
Prosecutor are reflecting pragmatic constraints, pragmatism in this context reflects a world of 
unequal sovereigns where, as set on above, power imbalances are a legacy of colonial 
imperialism. Equally if one follows Holly Kendall’s reading of the role of the Prosecutor at the 
ICC being to provide “symbolic validation … of the law’s authority by grounding it in the 
social order”, it is easy to read Article 15 powers as effectively putting a state’s domestic legal 
system on trial, in the manner of third element of inherent imperialism outlined in section 2.
95
  
Yet these prosecutorial choices would have happened under any international regime and 
whilst it is possible to argue that the ICC is an exceptional position, all international tribunal 
face problems of selectivity.
96
 What distinguishes the ICC is as   is the broader context of its 
origins and operation; as Nerida Chazal notes the ICC was intended to be an organisation 
designed to assist global governance.
97
 As Chazal goes onto note the ICC is caught between 
acknowledging the “unpredictability” of international society and the “desire for control and 
order” which guides its interpretation of international criminal law.98 This means that the 
powers of the prosecutor under Article 15 are in some way geared towards exercising a form of 
international control, potentially conforming to the different facets of inherent imperialism 
described in the first section above. 
This critique of the discretionary powers of the Prosecutor is arguably compounded by the 
relative lack of control that states have over the Prosecutor and over the ICC more generally. 
As Alison Danner notes, the Office of Prosecutor is caught between the notion of “quasi-
judicial independence” and being bound by the real political considerations in the exercise of 
its power.
99
 Whilst there is notional accountability, in that the Prosecutor is accountable to the 
Assembly of States Parties, this provides a relatively weak regime of formal accountability. In 
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the broader context of the ICC as an institution, this can be seen as another example of ICC 
adopting what Tallgren describes as the exclusive sense of “we” who possess law over “they” 
whom law needs to be applied.
100
  However, prosecutorial independence is an important 
concept if justice is to be administered fairly and as Joseph Isanga argued the criticism that 
Prosecutor is unaccountable and is susceptible to politicisation is somewhat “overstated”.101  It 
is not clear that Article 15 is inherently imperialist as it does not directly envisage a role for the 
Prosecutor that could be considered to place them in a dominant relationship over a state party 
and the powers the limited powers they do have in this respect are subject to a high degree of 
control by the Pre-Trial Chamber. In fact an imperialist interpretation of Article 15 is only 
possible when reading it in the broader context of the ICC’s operation or in tandem with other 
provisions.  
B. Are there any practical indications of Article 15’s inherent imperialism?  
A 2015 empirical study of Prosecutorial discretion at the ICC concluded that given the budget 
constraints and other political limitations, the Prosecutor had “picked the gravest situations for 
which it has jurisdiction”.102 Whilst there is little evidence that either of the two Prosecutors to 
date have utilised their power in a manner that has been overtly biased or politicised, the failure 
to exercise discretion in particular cases has compounded the double standards argument. 
David Bosco notes that shortly before the ICC began undertaking its first investigations in 
2004 senior staff were careful to issue informal reassurances that the Court’s focus would be 
“Congo not Iraq”.103 In 2006 the Prosecutor issued a letter confirming that although there was a 
reasonable basis to believe that British troops had committed war crimes in Iraq the crimes did 
not meet the sufficient gravity threshold under Article 17 for an investigation to be opened 
using Article 15.
104
 However this related to the nature of the crimes themselves and in 2014 the 
current Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, opened a preliminary examination of the situation in 
Afghanistan indicating a willingness – if warranted by the circumstances – to investigate 
international crimes linked to Western military interventions.
105
   
One area where the charge of inherent imperialism could potentially be levied is in relation to 
the potential partial application of prosecutorial power. For example Ocampo’s ex-gratia 
statements about individual defendant’s guilt which appeared to be pre-judging cases.106  The 
Appeals Chamber heavily criticised Ocampo noting that his “behaviour not only reflects poorly 
on the Prosecutor but …may lead observers to question the integrity of the Court as a 
whole.”107  Whilst this can be seen as imperialist in that it seems to be a judicial official acting 
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in manner that would infer the existence of a hierarchy in international law, these were the 
actions of an individual stepping outside the bounds of their authority, not really a sign of the 
inherent imperialism of the law facilitating their actions. Even if it were possible to read Article 
15 as inherently imperialist, it is unclear how Article 15 has had a distinct effect on the anti-
imperialist case against the ICC. Whilst there are features of the Rome Statute which Stahn 
terms “paternalising and disempowering” not all of these features are necessarily inherently 
imperialist, in that their disempowering features may have more to do with the application of 
the law than the law itself.
108
 As Stahn goes on to note these disempowering features may have 
the potential to be “handled more constructively” with closer consideration of local factors and 
solutions.
109
 Article 15 appears to fit into this category as it is perfectly possible that by 
improved and greater oversight of the office holder prosecutorial powers under Article 15 
could be applied in a way that minimises sovereign inequalities.  
6. Conclusion  
It is worth noting once again that some of the attacks on the ICC have been based more on 
short-term political expediency, than any sustained critique of the ICC and the law it applies. 
For example, in a 2013 paper to the Brookings Institute John Mukum Mbaku, a fellow of the 
African Growth Initiative observed that the tension between the ICC and state sovereignty, 
which was often characterised by anti-imperialist rhetoric, was in the Kenyan case essentially a 
way of deflecting difficult decisions about improving domestic legal structures.
110
 Criticising 
the court in strident anti-imperialist rhetoric was a way of bolstering the Kenyan government’s 
case against the ICC to both internal and external political audiences. Yet the persistence of 
this criticism is noteworthy not least because it is a powerful motivating factor for questioning 
the legitimacy of the Court and was a factor in some of the recent withdrawals, even if as 
Timothy Longman notes it was being used by states “to appear anti-imperial while protecting 
their own power and hiding abuse.”111  Anti-imperialism remains therefore an important means 
of undermining the Court’s overall legitimacy and whilst it is to an extent contingent on 
political relations the above argument shows that there are structural causes behind it linked to 
the structure of the law.  
Understanding inherent imperialism helps interpret the nature of an international instrument 
and the legal reality it envisages.  Where an instrument contains provisions that envisage an 
organisation whose operation relies upon existing hierarchical structures within international 
law and powers to weaken a state’s international legal sovereignty, that organisation is in a 
dominant relationship with state parties. This means that it is possible to legitimately describe 
the organisation as imperialist as it predicated upon a form of legal relationship with state 
parties that constrains their sovereignty or exacerbates existing conditions of sovereign 
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inequality. As argued in the final section, in relation to Article 15, inherent imperialism is not 
about the administration of the law but the text of the law itself.   
There are two potential mechanisms for addressing the inherent imperialism described above. 
Firstly, scholarship on the design of legal regimes noted that their capacity to resolve collective 
problems relies on how the process or bargaining works when states are treated on an equal 
footing.
112
 Recognising sovereign inequality in Article 17 by, for example, clarifying the nature 
of unwillingness and explicitly delinking it from any form of material constraint, alongside an 
extensive technical assistance for the domestic legal systems of state’s that might be subject to 
Article 17 – might go some way to addressing the sovereign inequality present in the 
complementarity doctrine. This would involve, not just requiring various administrative arms 
of the court to change their practice, but changing the law itself to entrench such policies into 
law so that they guide the operation of the different Chambers of the ICC. Secondly diluting 
the power of Security Council referrals under Article 13, by having a checking mechanism in 
the General Assembly or allowing the General Assembly to initiate referrals, would lessen the 
potential for permanent members of the Security Council to use this power for their own 
political ends.
113
  The extent to which this possible is part of what Leslie Vinjamuri describes 
as the Court’s authority paradox as it tries to operate under the principle that “justice must be 
independent from politics” but at the same time is “structurally dependent on states to enforce 
its mandate.”114 In this context some degree of inherent imperialism is inevitable in a 
supranational legal structure, but that does not mean that practical steps could not be taken to 
address some of the inherently imperialist features of the Rome Statute that directly cause 
political problems for the Court described above.  
The willingness to engage in any of these measures depends to a large extent on how much the 
inherent imperialism of Rome Statute matters which largely depends on the political 
perspective of the appraiser. In one sense it is important, as the ICC was originally a liberal 
project to universalise notions of justice and create an end to impunity for international 
crimes.
115
 This would mean that the inherent imperialism of the Rome Statute potentially poses 
a serious problem for the ICC’s legitimacy. In another sense the inherent imperialism of the 
ICC is simply a reflection of an unequal and imperfect world where great power politics mean 
that the Security Council retains a disproportionate power over international law and 
international criminal law. As Stahn observes, it may be unrealistic to expect that the Rome 
Statute can eradicate all the problems related to the application of international criminal law.
116
 
Yet in 2016 the escalating rate of withdrawals, seems to suggest that the tactical use of anti-
imperialism described above, is likely to obscure any potential attempt to tackle the structural 
causes of anti-imperialism within the Rome Statute.  
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